

HEGEL'S RELATION TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEMPORARIES; SCHELLING, BAADER, KRAUSE, HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER

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geological periods, could one be satisfied with the expression "immediate creation;" we children of a new era have no choice as to accepting or rejecting the theory of descent; we must accept it, because we can no longer defend the wonders of creation in all its crudity, such as the fashioning out of clay, and the breathing in breath, etc. In the process of nature, the newly arising species must, so far as they differ from the primitive organization, just produced by original creation, be descended from parents, of course, in some degree different from them. Although, therefore, the descent of all organic types from antecedent ones is an unavoidable necessity, yet is it reasonable enough to suppose that an agency may be used for the realization of the ideal relationship of nature's types, which is not exclusive of all others. Ideal relationship needs other ways and means for its realization beside genealogical relationship; the latter does not, as the followers of Darwin believe, exclude the former, while acting in its stead, and is, indeed, contained in it as the species is in the genus.

(To be Continued.)

HEGEL'S RELATION TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEMPORARIES; SCHELLING, BAADER, KRAUSE, HERBART, SCHOPENHAUER.

Translated from the German of Karl Rosenkranz, by GEO. S. HALL.

To those who are accustomed to read in the histories of German literature that Hegel corrupted his native language by the use of an unpardonable jargon, it must seem absurd to represent him as a German classic writer. If literary reviewers had read even his educational addresses or his criticisms, they would have hesitated to express such opinions; but they have based their judgments only upon scraps which they have excerpted from some encyclopædia article, or often from an anthology, in order to frighten away the reader from the study of such an abstruse corruptor of its language. In order to furnish grounds for the justness of the view here taken, determined as it is by

the study of his works individually, it becomes necessary to compare him with his philosophical co-workers.

From these we may omit Kant, Reinhold, Fichte and Jacobi, because the essential points of comparison with these have been already presented.* Of Kant it is necessary to remember only that he is the philosopher with whom Hegel stands in the closest relation, because he sought to bring Kant's critical principles and results to positive fulfillment.

Schelling, in his earliest philosophizing, found himself in a state of continuous transition and, although his successive utterances had very extraordinary effect, they lacked finished unity, on account of his progressive change of stand-point. After the publication of Hegel's Phenomenology, a change took place which was unquestionably more sharply marked by the appearance of the logic. Schelling's famous treatise on human freedom and subjects connected therewith, was the foundation of his new second system of philosophy. In this, two momenta appear, first, that which is called the rational philosophy, and second the philosophy of religion. The former which was to serve to the latter as an introduction, was the ideal substance of what he now negatively called philosophy—the science of reason in its *a priori* conception, that is, a companion work to the Hegelian Logic. There was no lack of profound passages in it, but as a whole it has a hypercritical tinge. Schelling's mind did not here move with that creative freedom which pervaded the treatises of his earlier years. He was constantly departing from his own thoughts and referring to the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, and the Neo-Platonists, to secure authority and support for his own assertions. He disguised ordinary categories in affected expressions; he called immediate being "das Wilde" (i. e., wild game); possibility is named "being able to be," (sein-könnende); necessity "not-possible-not-to-be," (nicht-nicht-sein-könnende): the idea the not-unthinkable, &c. He imitates Hegel's dialectic, but conceals the imitation by calling the categories potencies which set themselves in opposing tension as positive and negative.

Although this rational philosophy is essentially concerned with the notion of being and its various forms, yet, as rational it cannot attain to the actual. Reason (it is said) must deal with the

*Cf. "Hegel as German National Philosopher" republished from translations selected from the same work as the present chapter.—Tr.

quid, not with the *quod*—the knowledge of which latter should rest upon experience or upon faith. In the investigation of what is positive, or given, it must be granted all the determinations of negative philosophy, being, potentiality, unpotentiality, &c., appear.

Schelling offers us no distinct science. He does not say he will attempt to construct a philosophy of religion or a speculative theology, but turns to the history of religion to demonstrate there the history of the Absolute. He constructs a philosophy of mythology and revelation full of grand conceptions and dazzling images. Schelling wishes neither a pantheistic God, who vanishes in the phenomenal development of the Universe, nor a deistic God, of whom no one can say how he is occupied. He requires an *active* God, who works with the terrible earnestness of eternity, to re-subdue the world, estranged from him by the catastrophe of the fall, and to make himself again the Lord of being. Schelling's God is a trinity, who by the development of religion, becomes explicitly what he is in himself (implicitly). Father, Son and Spirit are potences of the Godhead, which in the theogony unfolds itself in humanity, in order at last, after the subjection of all that is finite and evil, to exist as actual, absolute unity. Schelling's God is a hero, who fights out the battle with the world, until he wins the final victory and receives the entire universe and the entire realm of mind and spirit into his now tranquil blessedness.

Since for Schelling history is theogony, or the *becoming* of God in humanity, till he becomes all in all, it is manifest how he could believe that he had raised the consciousness of humanity to a higher stage, and turned a new leaf in its history. Although heretics of the earlier Christian centuries had taught something like this, he surpassed them far in boldness of speculation and in thorough elaboration of historical material.

All this display of a sublime thinker fell short of the expected result, because it was not so much a real philosophy as a refinement of phantasy in which the presupposed and unattainable categories of a distorted metaphysics were to explain the facts of history, and these in turn to illustrate metaphysics. Thus a fruitless mingling of speculation and empiricism was produced, that at first surprized and dazzled, but left no trace of the hoped and promised satisfaction. Facts were interpreted according to cate-

gories and were artificially arranged. No one longer doubts that Schelling's representation of the Oriental religions belonged to a stand-point which has become antiquated for science—that of Creuzer. No one longer doubts that his apprehension was extremely one-sided, resting upon that of the Chthonian [Infernal] deities. He had previously sought to make the deities of Samothrace the key of mythology. Now it was the myth of Persephone and the three Dionysii. The Uranian deities, and the genuine Hellenic myth of Prometheus, so intimately connected with it, were scarcely touched. The Jewish religion was presented only in dim outline, chiefly to cause us to note that the principal passages of Messianic prophecy speak of the Messiah in a past tense: "Who hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows, and was scourged for our transgressions," &c. The Christology of the New Testament is collected with great industry from all the New Testament writings without distinction, and quite without criticism. It leaves the ethic elements entirely aside, and follows out the cosmic relations of the persons of the Trinity and Lucifer. The result is barren and tedious—because it always explains the deepest references to God and man into the play of the positive and negative potences. As if, by such external quantitative determinations, processes of mind and spirit, their absolute dis severance and atonement, could be conceived. The unschooled reader is astonished to read that Christ has become B², or something of that sort. He assumed in the background a profound mystery which he was incompetent to understand, but these potences are really only an expression of the absence of conception.

After all our admiration of his gigantic endeavor (for here we must be just toward him) we cannot fail in the end to regard Schelling's work as unsuccessful, and to rank Hegel's philosophy of religion far higher, because it comes nearer the truth. Even the presentation which Hegel had given in the *Phenomenology of the religions of Nature, of Art, and of Revelation*, was far superior to the artificial view of Schelling. His later works on the philosophy of religion are even yet unsurpassed for their congruity with historical fact, no less than by their clearness of thought. To realize this, one only need compare, e. g., Schelling's presentation of Indian mythology with that which Hegel has given of the same in his critique of Humboldt's *Bhagavat Gita*; or the development of the origin of evil which Hegel has given

in his philosophy of religion in the section entitled "The Kingdom of the Son," with Schelling's Satanology, in order to observe how much more precise, penetrating and distinct Hegel's exposition is. This Hegel himself closed with the consciousness of here having unveiled the deepest depth.

Schelling comes near the same thing, but gets no further than the exegesis of mythical forms,—that Satan was worshiped by heretical sects as the brother of Christ, that he had fallen like lightning from heaven, &c., &c.

It is well known that immediately after Hegel's death Schelling publicly criticized him very severely. He sought to degrade him to the rank of another Wolf, who knew how to produce only the mechanical work of the understanding, and to exalt himself to the position of another Leibnitz, whose thought had furnished material for the uncreative, work-a-day talent of this after-comer. We will not go further into this sad history, for it was possible only for a passionate rivalry so to misapprehend and disparage the author of the "Phenomenology." Schelling loved to seem imposing. All that he produced must be new, original, path-finding, while Hegel forgot himself in his science, and was intent only on the knowledge of truth, without noise or display.

After Schelling it is most fitting to consider the relation in which Hegel stood to Franz von Baader. Hoffmann has sought to show by extensive references that Baader was not a follower of Schelling, as he had often been called. We willingly admit that Baader's was an independent mind, and even that Schelling had been much influenced by him. We will stand by Baader as Baader, and not trouble ourselves to inquire how he became what he was. A transient personal relation between Baader and Hegel had been formed, when the former returned from Königsberg through Berlin to Bavaria. Hegel himself referred to him in the preface of the second edition of his encyclopædia. He recognized the profundity of Baader's knowledge, designated its kind and manner as *gnosis*, and intimated that he would gladly come into friendly relation with it, because the Notion might be recognized even in the obscure forms of representation. These forms themselves he declared inadequate for science, because they were too unstable and ambiguous, while stern demonstrating thought could not dispense with the purity and distinctness of the logical notion.

As Baader derived his first principle from the writings of Ja-

cob Boehme, we can best see from the elaborate presentation which Hegel has given of Boehme in the History of Philosophy, how well he knew how to prize the speculative content of the *Philosophus Teutonicus*, while rejecting his presentation as unscientific and barbarous. The Belgian physician, van Gheert, presented him with a Dutch edition of Boehme. Hegel expressed his thanks with manifest pleasure, but still expressed the same judgment. The romantic school over-estimated the theosophist of Goerlitz, because his seething fancy and his venturesome and picturesque expressions were so utterly opposed to the aridity of understanding shown in the pseudo-philosophy of the *Eclaircissement*. So far as Baader proposed the resurrection of Boehme's philosophy as his own chief purpose, nothing can be said of a system which was peculiarly his. But so far as he undertook to translate Boehme into the culture of our own time, he showed his individuality by explaining, elaborating, broadening and enriching. The fact that Boehme was a Protestant and Baader a Catholic caused a poorly concealed discrepancy which occasioned for the latter manifold processes of comparison. Here he found aid in the church fathers, the scholastic writers, the mystics, St. Martin, the *philosophe inconnu* of the French, and in poets. His thoughts almost constantly find their affinities among those of foreign writers. He appropriated much especially from the legitimistic French school of De Maistre, Bonald, Ballanche, &c. Baader could write a pithy style, which smacked somewhat of North German provincialism, but the innumerable citations of foreign authors, together with an excessive use of Latin and French expressions, gives his style a very motley appearance. In polemics, as notably in his *Fermentis Cognitionis*, he is often really witty. The calm perfecting of a sequential and elaborated process of science, is not his way. He writes now a lecture, now a short essay, but can give a more comprehensive presentation only in the form of detached sentences and remarks, as, e. g., his theory of sacrifice. He loves to be striking, and to coquette with mystery, even in the titles of his minor writings: Of Lightning as the Father of Light; Of the Curse and Blessing of Creatures; Of Mind developed as Positive and Negative; Of the Foundation of Ethics upon Physics, &c. In his inmost thought he is dialectic. He took great interest in Hegel's construction of concepts, because, for a time at least, he compared it with the sacred Ternary of Boehme, to behold in all created things the im-

age of the creative trinity. He commonly disguised his dialectic under two concrete forms, viz.: the processes of nutrition and of generation. He writes of physical, intellectual, ethical and religious propagation and sustentation, and thereby arrives not infrequently at a really coarse materialism, (as in the doctrine of the transubstantiation of our body through the partaking of the Eucharist) and often at the very phantastic, baseless transcendentalism of a spirit world, which supports the relations between God and man as agent and guide. The process of generation, to the various phases of which, like another Ruysbroek, he so often reverts, is inherent in his theology, which develops the process of the self-production of God as *genitor* and *genitus*.

Baader was an anti-revolutionary philosopher. His politics aimed at a restoration of the aristocratic corporations of the nobility and clergy. As, under the reign of Louis Philippe, the proletariat made statesmen more and more uneasy, he thought to check the threatening anarchy of communistic principles by social philosophy, and by a corporate organization of the fourth estate. He became accustomed, by reading French partizan journals, to designate the doctrines of rationalism, materialism and popular sovereignty, &c., by the unhappy and abusive phrase, *crimes of intelligence*, and thus to impeach them before royalty, especially before the monarchs of Russia and of Prussia. A reformatory impulse was strong within him, which made him seek at least to separaté the Romano-German church, as a national episcopacy, from the church of Rome. So the German Catholics may appeal to his pamphlet on this point as an authority.

Since, as an author, Baader was disorderly and always fragmentary, it follows that almost everything can be found by searching through his works, at least in the negative form of criticism of other stand-points. It is precisely in the necessity of interpreting his aphorisms and of thinking them collectively as moments of a higher unity, that an explanation is found of that inspiration with which his followers cling to him, for they must exert themselves to obtain a symmetrical view of his effulgurations and can roam through a wide field of secondary relations. To these we must admit unhesitatingly that Baader contains a system of

1. Theology.
2. Physiology.
3. Anthropology.

We may go further and affirm that the systematic imperfection

of detail in Baader's speculations, has an advantage over a system finished on all sides, in expansive elasticity, which will admit of greater productive freedom in reflection. With still better pretext, from a skeptical stand-point, all striving for system may be rejected as a dogmatic complication. It would however be doing Baader injustice to object that he did not recognize the conception of system as necessary for absolute science. In his polemics, especially against those who are timid or lazy in thinking, his consciousness of the organic totality of science is plainly apparent, though his adherence to it is only by slight intimations. In large cities are often found collections of antiquities where old arms, carvings in ivory, painted windows, golden chains and bracelets, statuettes, Chinese vases, &c., are piled confusedly together. Every article has by itself great value. The great diversity is charming, but at last produces weariness. Thus it is with Baader's writings. They stimulate by their diversified charms, but do not satisfy because they do not lead to real science. Erdmann, a Hegelian, in his *History of Modern Philosophy*, has accomplished the colossal task of presenting Baader's thoughts according to their intrinsic interconnection. This is the only attempt thus far made. Baader's admirers, the brave, indefatigable Hoffmann at their head, supported by Lutterbach, Hammerger, Schlüter and others, have sought in all directions, but none of them have worked out a distinct science which may serve as a touchstone of Baader's principles.

Is this accident? Scarcely, but it lies in the principles themselves as a characteristic element, which makes a science impossible and impels to an abstruse mysticism. The superior criticism with which Hoffmann so brilliantly vindicates Baader's achievements, may indeed be said to exhibit negatively the short comings and one-sidedness of others with great clearness, and to conclude every recension with the refrain that, in Baader's philosophy, truth is more profoundly apprehended than in any other. What then hinders this pretended superiority from manifesting itself in a real science of logic, natural philosophy, psychology, morals, &c.? The limitation which has prevented this lies in Baader's doctrine of the corruption of nature by evil. Jacob Boehme postulates the negative, wrath, division, separation, or whatever else it may be termed, in God himself, who eternally subdues the chaos of its opposing element to a Paradisian kingdom of joy. This view makes him interesting for Hegel, because

he borrowed from the allegorizing language of Boehme, from the wilderness of his phantasms, that which he esteemed for its speculative content. Baader clung to and elaborated this mythic form in only one point, viz: the notion that nature had been originally in God something quite different from its present empirical existence, and that the cause of this change lay in Evil. We cannot but approve when a man like Boehme believes that the virginity of nature was deflowered by the fall out of Eden, and that all that is wild, poisonous, rough, formless, or bitter, originated with the phenomenal existence of nature.

In the face of the natural science of to-day such notions can no longer be maintained. Without renouncing his claim to be scientific, Baader could only make them plausible by relapsing into a Manichæan Pessimism.

He assumed first a nature in God. This may be conceived, for nature can have its principle only in the Absolute; and this expressed in philosophical terms means that nature itself is a form in which the Absolute manifests itself. The language of religion expresses this in the words, God made nature; but true nature, according to Baader, should be without time, space, or materiality. We have no conception of such a spaceless, timeless, absolutely immaterial nature. It is a dogmatic fiction. In order to explain the existence of nature as known to us, Baader makes, in the second place, the hypothesis that the spirits created by God brought forth, by their selfishness, space, time, matter, and thus nature as it appears to us. Evil becomes the principle of matter. Nature, thus begotten, is yet in part divine, and is thus enjoyed by unfallen spirits in ethereal bodies, but it is in part corrupted and denaturalized by spirits of evil. Nature as present to us, is no longer *res integra*, but is, according to Baader, blighted. The gravity of matter, heat and cold, volcanoes and storms, parasitic plants and animals, certain small insects which plague men and animals, rapacious animals, disease, &c. All this is the product of Evil. God would never have created a nature with glaciers and deserts, and tornadoes, and thunder-storms, with serpents and carnivorous animals. These are the work of fallen spirits, Lucifer at their head. These, according to Baader, are allowed by the grace of God to serve rebellious spirits as an investing corporeity, to lighten their endurance of infernal torment. Hence he says of the suicide:

“Here he stood hidden behind the thicket.

There he stands discovered and naked.

How he has cheated himself." [i. e., how foolish for the suicide in his pain to throw off the earthly covering which shielded him, though imperfectly, from the fire of hell].

Baader thus teaches on the one hand, quite rightly, that we should apprehend God not as devoid of nature, but as free from nature (i. e., as not conditioned by it), and he applies this distinction quite justly to man. The polemic which he develops from this point against abstract deism and spiritualism is perfectly justified. But on the other hand he does not know how to get along with actual nature, because, although it exhibits traces of primitive divinity, it is essentially a caricature of divine Paradisical nature tinged with infernal elements. Like Schubert in "The Night Side of Nature," Baader speaks often quite poetically of the veil of melancholy that is spread over all nature. This has been admired and repeated without producing any distinct conceptions. The truth is that nature possesses all temperaments. She is not only melancholy but also sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, as e. g., fishes are phlegmatic, amphibia melancholy, birds sanguine, and mammals choleric. Who will call the aspect of the starry heavens, the shining sun, the sparkling of its beams on the waves, or the diversified beauty of flowers, or the riot and swarming of animal life, with its abounding energy, melancholy? Nature traverses all these moods in the processes of the day and the year. In the waves that break foaming upon the rocks, in the thunderstorm, in the battle of colossal beasts she is heroic. Baader's natural philosophy becomes itself sickly with this doctrine of the morbidity of nature. Hegel is said to have remarked of the animal world, on account of its steadfast self-externality, because it lacked the centre of a consciousness reposing on itself, that it was concrete pain, but he has treated nature as that in which divine reason manifested itself. Every diabolization of nature seeks refuge behind certain Bible texts, in order to find the support of revealed authority, but it ignores the fact that Christ, earnestly as he requires us to lay violent hands upon nature in the interest of good morals, never asserts or implies that the body or even nature is an inadequate organ for the freedom of the spirit. The lilies of the field are to Him more beautiful than Solomon in all his glory.

Where does the rational begin in nature, where does it cease? That which Baader calls the irrational, the anti-divine, the infer-

nal in nature is, when one speaks scientifically, so closely intertwined with the rational that it cannot be separated from it; it is rather a rational element of it, as Carus among others has so excellently shown. Natural science should not trouble itself with that Eudæmonism which takes offence at nature because pain and death exist in it. It should investigate the laws of nature, their interconnection, the gradual succession of natural organisms and have nothing else before its eye. If it has been often said in modern times that the scientific man should conduct his investigations atheistically, this has a reasonable interpretation in the fact that the scientific man has only to do with the powers of nature when dealing with nature. The relation of nature to God belongs to Theology. The relation of nature to the will of man belongs to Ethics and history. If I admire the figure of a cone with its many properties, it may serve me with a bridge [metaphor] to elevate my thoughts to the conception of spirits which can think such a figure in their eternal thoughts. But in the mathematical consideration of a cone, I have nothing to do with pathos, for with it I should destroy the purity and accuracy of the scientific apprehension.

Baader's entire science of nature is corrupted through his theology. God should be emancipated, according to Baader, from what may as evil be unpleasant to us, and therefore it is imputed to fallen spirits, whose selfishness has produced the diabolical miracle of the creation of so miserable a world. Here Baader harmonizes perfectly with Schopenhauer, who had gone so far as to look upon nature as merely a piece of botch-work.

Baader speaks often in an edifying manner of the transfiguration of nature, and is liberal in his use of fancies of eschatology. The only transfiguration of nature which we can comprehend is the correct cultivation of the same, and the influence of the ethical purity of our will upon our organism. The purity and goodness of the soul beautifies even an innate hatefulness. The attempt has been made to give us a science of nature which should eliminate out of it the negative,—which should deny the necessity of death or the indispensableness of sickness. If we human beings mistreat nature, we must bear also the misery which we thereby bring upon us.

Ireland is fitted for the growth of grass and the raising of cattle, through its soil and climate. If, therefore, the Irish whimsically devote themselves to the culture of wheat and potatoes in

a moist soil, it is no matter of wonder if they often have to suffer from failure of crops and consequent famine.

The polemic which Baader published after Hegel's death, against his philosophy, attacks the latter in spite of Hegel's express declarations, as Pantheism, without penetrating scientifically the meaning of Hegel's Logic or his Philosophy of Religion. When Baader began to edit his lectures upon dogmatics, he devoted the first part to Marheineke, who had elaborated Protestant dogmatics from the stand-point of Hegel. But this was only one of Baader's transitory paroxysms. My noble, highly honored friend, Hoffmann, who has devoted his life and property to the editing and propaganda of Baader's works, can never restrain his astonishment at the blindness of the world which cannot find absolute satisfaction in Baader's mysticism, nor discover that the future of philosophy does not belong to Schelling or Hegel, Herbart or Schopenhauer, but to Baader. Certainly the Philosophy of Baader, through its depth, its wealth of fancy and wit, will always collect around it a small circle of followers, but for a commanding position in the world it lacks the true scientific character which Hoffmann has claimed for it.

[The remainder of this article, which relates to Krause, Herbart, and Schopenhauer, will appear in a future number of this Journal].

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

Does Formal Logic Explain Active Processes?

Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy :

It is claimed by speculative philosophers that Formal Logic is the law of the statical only, and that processes fail of solution on the plane of the understanding, and must be referred to Reason. The formal logicians however hold (in the language of John Stuart Mill) "that such an admission would be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the reasoning faculty itself." I have never seen an explicit illustration of the different methods employed by the mind on the two planes, viz: Understanding and Reason, and I therefore submit one, herewith, to the criticism of your readers.